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EIS FOR URANIUM MINING OPERATION ON
INDIAN LANDS RULED ADEQUATE

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EIS for uranium exploration and mining
lease on Indian land found to be adequate if it acknowledges pos-

sible detrimental effects, although no method or plan to control such
effects is discussed. Tribe is a necessary but not indispensable party to
such suit. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977).

In January 1974 the Navajo Tribal Council approved an Agreement to grant Exxon Corp. the right to explore for and mine uranium on tribal lands. Under the terms of 25 U.S.C. § § 396(a) and
415, the Secretary of the Interior must approve any such agreement.
Specifically, § 396(a) provides that unalloted lands "within any
Indian reservation or lands owned by any tribe, group, or band of
Indians under Federal jurisdiction... may with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by the authority of the tribal council." Section 415 provides that "any restricted Indian lands . . . may be leased by the Indian owners, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior ... for the development

or utilization of natural resources in connection with operations
under such leases" and that prior to the approval of any lease the
Secretary of the Interior "shall first satisfy himself that adequate
consideration has been given to the relationship between the use of
the leased lands and the use of neighboring lands ... and the effect

on the environment of the uses to which the leased lands will be
subject."
In addition, the Secretary is to consider an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), as mandated by the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). 1 The requirement for an EIS was recognized in the
earlier case of Davis v. Morton,2 where it was held that the leasing of
Indian lands constituted "major Federal action" under NEPA. 3
The EIS for the Navajo-Exxon Agreement was prepared by the
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)
(1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPAl.
Z. 469 F.2d 593 (1972).
3. In an action against the United States for failure of the government to follow NEPA
before approving a 99-year lease on an Indian reservation, the court held that the granting of
such a lease constituted "major federal action" within NEPA and thus an EIS must be filed.
Id. at 597.
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BIA, and after considering it along with the pertinent regulations,
Rogers C. B. Morton, then Secretary of the Interior, approved the
agreement.
The lawsuit arose when 17 individuals of the Navajo Tribe sought
to enjoin performance of the agreement, alleging that the EIS was
inadequate. Plaintiffs were denied a preliminary injunction and the
action was dismissed for nonjoinder of an indispensable party,
namely the Navajo Tribe.4 Plaintiffs appealed both the denial of the
injunction and the dismissal for failure to join the tribe.
NONJOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTY
The first issue considered on appeal was whether any action could
be maintained without the presence of the Tribe. Attorneys for the
Interior Department and Exxon argued that because the Navajo
Tribe is not amenable to suit without consent, it may not be made an
involuntary party to the action. The Court of Appeals agreed, citing
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma.5 However, the court felt that the
more basic question was whether or not the Tribe was in fact a
necessary or indispensable party as defined in Rule 19(a)(2)(i) and
(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
Plaintiffs argued that Rule 19 requirements were not determinative, citing Heckman v. U.S.7 In that case the United States Attorney
General, seeking to cancel conveyances of lands made by members of
the Cherokee Nation, did not make the Indian grantors parties to the
suit. The Heckman court decided that the grantors were not necessary parties, stating that there could be no more complete representation than when the United States acted on behalf of its dependents.
Declining to follow Heckman, the court found that financial and
other benefits to the Navajo Tribe under the agreement gave the
Tribe sufficient interest, independent of that of the United States, to
meet the requirement of a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(2)(i). 8
They found that the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary may
conflict with the interests of the Tribe, and citing New Mexico v.
Aamodt9 found that when there is a conflict of interests, the representation of the Indians by the United States is not adequate.
4. 558 F.2d 556, at 557.

5. 461 F.2d 674 (1972).
6. 28 U.S.C. app. (1970). The court must consider whether an absent party claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest.
7. 224 U.S. 413 (1912).
8. Supra note 4, at 558.
9. 537 F.2d 1102 (1976).
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Having found the Tribe to be a necessary party under Rule 19(a),
the court then considered whether the Tribe was an indispensable
party under Rule 19(b).' 0 Rule 19(b) outlines factors which must be
considered in determining whether the trial court should dismiss for
nonjoinder undispensability.' 1
The court relied chiefly on Tewa Tesuque v. Morton. 2 This 1974
class action was brought by members of the Tewa Indian Tribe seeking damages and cancellation of a 99-year lease between the Tribe
and developers. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the action
on the ground that the Tribe was an indispensable party, the Court
of Appeals stated:
The Tewa's contention that the Pueblo is not an indispensable party
is erroneous. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by the judgment. As lessor of the lease agreement entered
into with Sangre [developers] , the Pueblo will certainly be affected
if the lease is cancelled. Therefore, it is an indispensable party.
Further, the Pueblo may not be joined without its consent
or the
1 3
consent of Congress in light of its quasi-sovereign status.
The court distinguished the facts before them from Tewa Tesuque.
There the plaintiffs had attacked the lease and sought cancellation of
it, whereas here the relief sought was based on the inadequate EIS. A
holding that the EIS was inadequate would not necessarily result in
prejudice to the Tribe, and the only result would be a new EIS. The
requested relief did not call for any action by or against the Tribe,
and there were no tribal remedies or procedures available to plaintiffs
for attack on a Federal EIS. In addition, the court found that dismissal for nonjoinder of an indispensable party in the present action
would produce a situation whereby no party except the Tribe could
seek review of environmental impact statements on Indian lands.
Avoiding this result, they found the Tribe not to be indispensable.
10. 19(b) states that: "if a person as described in subdivision (a) hereof cannot be made a
party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should be
dismissed, the absent party being thus regarded as indispensable." 28 U.S.C. app. Rule 19(b)
(1970).
11. These factors are:
1) The extent to which a judgment rendered in the party's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties.
2) The extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment the prejudice can be lessened or avoided.
3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate.
4) Whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
12. Id. 498 F.2d 240 (1974).
13. Id. at 242.
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ADEQUACY OF EIS
The court next reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction,
which sought to halt performance of the lease agreement because of
the alleged inadequacy of the EIS. In doing so it looked first to the
terms of the agreement for which the EIS was written. It was pointed
out that the agreement provides for compliance with government
regulations requiring the filing of further mining and exploration
plans.1 4 The agreement also provides that should Exxon elect to
make the lease effective it must take whatever action may become
necessary to protect the public health and environment and to meet
the requirements of federal and state air and water pollution controls.' I Operations may be suspended or restricted if they threaten
damage to the environment.' 6 The court used the existence of these
regulations to emphasize the many methods that are available for
protecting the public health and environment aside from those of
NEPA.' ' In finding the Exxon EIS sufficient, the court relied on
National Helium Corp. v. Morton,' 8 where it was held that an EIS is
not judicially reviewable on its merits. The National Helium court
limited the extent of review of an EIS to:
1) Whether (the statement) discusses all of the five procedural
requirements of NEPA.
2) Whether the Environmental Impact Statement constitutes an
objective good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA.
3) Whether the Statement contains a reasonable discussion of the
1
subject matter involved in the five required areas. 9
The court in the instant case also declared that the "rule of
reason," as defined in Sierra Club v. Stamm,20 must be applied in a
judicial testing.
14. See 25 C.F.R. § 177.6 (1977) and 30 C.F.R. § 231.10(a) & (b) (1977).
15. See 30 C.F.R. § § 231.4 and 231.73 (1977).
16. See 30 C.F.R. § 231.73(c) (1977) and 25 C.F.R. § 177.4(d) (1977).
17. NEPA states that any EIS must consider:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
NEPA, supra note 1.
18. 486 F.2d 995 (1973).
19. Id. at 1002-03.
20. 507 F.2d 788, 793 (1974): "[J] udicial review of an impact statement is limited to a
determination of whether the statement is a 'good faith, objective, and reasonable' presenta-
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Having said this, the court briefly considered plaintiffs' objections
to the EIS. They dismissed several objections by stating that even
when plaintiffs have contradicting scientific evidence, the court will
not allow a battle of experts, and will instead follow the opinion of
the government's experts. In dismissing another objection relating to
surface mining, the court stated, "It is enough that the EIS covers
the problems related to surface mining and the Secretary was advised
of them ... ."

1

Similarly, concerning the emission of the inert

radioactive gas, radon, the court said that the recognition of the
problem in the EIS was sufficient. Finally, answering plaintiffs' contention that the EIS does not adequately discuss the cumulative
effect of the project, the court stated, "It is enough that the EIS
2
mentions and discusses foreseeable problems.""2
The result of all
this is a finding that the EIS is a "comprehensive, good faith, objective and reasonable presentation" of the areas required by NEPA.
The decision of this case may be useful in allowing members of an
Indian Tribe into court to contest an EIS, but it has no effect on
Tewa Tesuque in that tribal members cannot have an agreement itself
invalidated without joinder of the Tribe. And simply being able to
get into court will do little good, for the holding encourages a lenient
standard of judicial review to be used for an EIS, although technically the decision relates only to the denial of a preliminary
injunction and not to the final substantive validity of the EIS.
Not only did the court allow the EIS to make a mere mention of
problems and to use contradicted expert opinion, but it also improperly considered regulations as a means of justifying the project.
The EIS and other factors the Secretary is to consider are the only
criteria that should be used to allow a project to commence. The
regulations concerning mining should be considered only after
approval of the project and should not be considered with the EIS.
The EIS must be able to stand alone.
Because the court refuses to "second-guess" the experts who write
environmental statements and because they consider mining regulations at an inappropriate point, the question becomes whether the
courts are even the proper forum in which to decide if an EIS is
adequate.
BARBARA STEPHENSON
tion of the subject areas mandated by NEPA ... in thus testing the sufficiency of a final
environmental statement, the courts should not engage in 'second guessing' the experts who
have prepared the statement."
21. Supra note 4, at 560.
22. Id. at 561.

